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Abstract 
Primarily between 1833 and 1840, Whewell attempted to accomplish what 
natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to 
provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to 
establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. In the essay at hand, I 
document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science 
(especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I 
claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology 
is more fundamental than has hitherto been documented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Whewell’s philosophical, historical and scientific project has 
recently regained scholarly interest: a new edition of his collected 
work, edited by Richard Yeo, appeared in 2001 (CW
1) and between 2005 and 2008 three important monographs on 
Whewell fell from the press (Wettersten, 2005; Snyder, 2006; 
Reidy, 2008).2 Michael S. Reidy’s monograph is the first of its kind: 
it focuses on contextualising Whewell’s tidal research. 
Primarily between 1833 and 1840, William Whewell 3 
attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and “scientists” 
(a neologism he coined in 1833) since at least Galileo4 had failed to 
do so: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged empirical study of 
the tides and to establish a general scientific theory of tidal 
phenomena.5 Eventually, a royal medal would be awarded to him 
and John W. Lubbock in 1837 for their joint tidal research. 6 
According to R. Robson and Walter F. Cannon, Whewell 
 3 
“effectively founded these studies as an on-going scientific 
enterprise along lines which seem quite familiar today”  (Robson & 
Cannon, 1964, p. 184). Whewell was one of the key-figures in the 
“spatial turn” in tidology, which led to a worldwide collaborative 
research-project of tidal phenomena between maritime states (Yeo, 
1993, pp. 164-169).  
Both Snyder’s and especially Reidy’s recent monograph 
break with the frequently upheld view that Whewell was mainly an 
observer and critic of science. According to Richard Yeo, Whewell 
was essentially a meta-scientist or looker-on-science 7 , i.e. he 
created for himself “a role as the critic and reviewer, adjudicator 
and legislator of science” (Yeo, 1993, p. 8). With respect to the 
tides more specifically, Yeo noted that Whewell “felt inadequate in 
not being able to push beyond careful observation to an advance in 
‘hydrodynamical theory’” (ibid., pp. 54-55). Menachem Fisch 
dismissed the importance of Whewell’s tidal studies for his 
philosophical-methodological views (Fisch, 1991a, pp. 58-59).  
Joan Richards’ opinion on the matter is closely aligned with Yeo’s 
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for she claims that Whewell “was more an observer [of science] 
than a participant [in science]” (Richards, 1996, p. 235). Yeo 
stresses that Whewell’s contributions in mineralogy and tidology 
“were important, but neither met his own criteria for truly 
significant advances in science, and they did not compare with 
those of leading men of science he counted among his friends” 
(Yeo, 1993, p. 54; cf. Yeo, 2009). Yeo strengthens his thesis of 
Whewell as a looker-on science by pointing to the fact that “he did 
not consider himself a major scientific discoverer” (ibid.; cf. Yeo, 
2009) and that he failed to establish the new hydrodynamics 
required to tackle the problem of the tides (ibid., pp. 54-55). 8 
However, from both observations it follows only that Whewell did 
not see himself as a great scientist, not that he did not see himself 
as a scientist tout court. Moreover, to claim that Whewell was 
primarily an observer of science and not a participant is somewhat 
unfair in light of his numerous scientific papers on the tides (cf. 
Reidy, 2008, pp. 126-127). Granted, his tidal research did not 
establish an adequate theory that could explain all tidal phenomena, 
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however, Whewell surely thought that the process of collecting a 
body of trustworthy data and that exploring the equilibrium-
hypothesis (in its standard or modified version), which potentially 
could explain these data, constituted genuine progress in tidology. 
Laura J. Snyder points out that Whewell, in view of his tidal 
researches, “had first-hand knowledge about the methods of 
empirical research” (Snyder, 2006, p. 150) and that “both current 
scientific practice and the history of science were important to 
Whewell in developing his philosophy of science” (ibid., p. 151). 
Moreover, in his recent book Michael S. Reidy stresses the 
importance of Whewell’s tidal researches for the methodological 
views he developed in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
(1840): “His early work on tidology also taught him valuable 
lessons concerning the discovery process, including the difficulty 
of connecting facts with theory, the disparate ways of testing those 
theories, and the proper methods of data analysis and 
representation.” (Reidy, 2008, p. 14, cf. p. 155). More specifically, 
Reidy has called attention to the connection between Whewell’s 
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tidal research and his discussion of the “Special Methods of 
Induction Applicable to Quantity” in Philosophy of the Inductive 
Science, i.e. the Method of Means, Least Squares9, Residues, and 
Curves 10  (Reidy, 2008, p. 182, p. 220, p. 245). 11  Reidy has 
convincingly shown that the quantitative methods were standard 
exercises in Whewell’s tidology. Reidy (Reidy, 2008) did not show, 
however, that Whewell’s views on scientific methodology changed 
overtime in view of his tidal research, neither did he engage much 
in Whewell’s philosophy of science. By doing so here, I provide 
additional substance to Reidy’s recent suggestion that the sections 
on the Special Methods in the Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences12 rendered explicit the changed views that Whewell came 
to from his studies in tidology.13 Though agreeing to a large extent 
with Snyder’s and Reidy’s recent findings, I seek to go beyond 
their claims. So far, no systematic and detailed attempt has been 
made to connect Whewell’s philosophy of scientific methodology 
with his scientific practice.14 
 7 
In this essay, I attempt to trace the close intertwinement 
between Whewell’s philosophical views on scientific methodology 
and his actual scientific practise as a researcher of tidal phenomena. 
I shall begin my study (see section 2) by putting Whewell’s 
tidology in the context of physical astronomy, i.e. his tidology will 
be put within the context of the Newtonian theoretical framework – 
a point which has escaped the attention of previous commentators 
(Deacon, 1971; Reidy, 2008; Ruse, 1976 and 1991).  
Next, it will be shown in section 3 that Whewell’s thoughts 
on scientific methodology in the early 1830s (as expressed in his 
1830-1833 notebooks on induction) were still quite rudimentary. I 
show that Whewell’s views on scientific methodology changed 
significantly between the early 1830s and 1840 (see sections 3 and 
4). This change did not involve Whewell’s abandonment of his 
earlier views on methodology, but rather refers to a more 
sophisticated level of detail and elaboration of his later views vis-à-
vis his early views. As a welcome side-effect, my analysis of 
Whewell’s notebooks on induction further points to the difficulties 
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of Menachem Fisch’s “erotetic reconstruction” of Whewell’s 
intellectual development, according to which Whewell’s early 
textbooks on mechanics were the starting point of an attempt to 
explain the structure of excellent science and Whewell developed a 
philosophical position in which both his Baconian and Langrangian 
inclinations could be reconciled. 15  As Fisch’ reconstruction has 
been found untenable 16 , the quest for a more accurate 
reconstruction is still open.17  Here, I want to study if and how 
Whewell’s tidal studies contributed to the development of his later 
and more sophisticated views on methodology.  
Hereafter, I turn to Whewell’s tidal research proper (see 
section 4). In subsection 4.1, I document Whewell’s tidal research. 
Next, I argue that not only Whewell’s historical studies of science18 
but also his tidal research offered Whewell a concrete means to 
develop and refine his methodological views (see subsections 4.2 
and 4.3). His philosophy of science inspired his scientific practice 
and conversely.19 This will be shown by focussing on Whewell’s 
attempt of putting equilibrium-theory to the test, his comments on 
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the criteria for useful hypotheses and the occurrence of consilience 
of inductions in tidology. Contrary to my claims on the Special 
Methods, I do not claim that Whewell’s methodology (with regards 
to theory-testing, criteria for fruitful hypotheses and consilience) 
was the outcome of his tidal research: both constantly interacted 
and it is hard to tell cause from effect. In the same subsection a 
discussion of Whewell’s 1848 Bakerian Lecture is also provided – 
an important methodological paper missed by Reidy in his recent 
monograph. Next to this, an issue that has baffled previous 
commentators is resolved: namely, Whewell’s preference for 
equilibrium-theory. It can be show that Whewell’s commitment to 
equilibrium-theory can be explained by his own methodological 
considerations on what counts as a useful hypothesis. Past 
commentators, who did not systematically study the interaction 
between Whewell’s methodology and tidology, have missed this 
point. 
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2. Tidology as a Branch of Physical Astronomy 
 
In his first papers on the tides, Whewell reflected on the 
state-of-the-art knowledge of “tidology”, i.e. the study of (the laws 
of) the tides.20 Whewell remarked that, although a lot of progress in 
bringing theory and evidence in accordance with each other had 
been made by Newton (Newton, 1999, pp. 874-880), Bernoulli 
(Bernoulli, 1738), Bremontier (Bremontier, 1809), the Webers 
(Weber & Weber, 1825), Russell (Russell, 1838), Fourier (Fourier , 
1818), Cauchy (Cauchy , 1827), Kelland (Kelland, 1840 and 1844) 
and Airy (Airy, 1845), no one had yet been able to explain tidal 
phenomena in their particulars (HIS, II, p. 57). Imagine, Whewell 
wrote, that our current astronomical knowledge was swept away 
“by some great natural or moral convulsion” and that only a few 
general notions, such as universal gravitation, concerning 
astronomy remained but that “the resources of mathematical art”, 
“the collected stores of observation”, and “the habit and apparatus 
of observing” (Whewell (1834a), p. 15; Whewell (1836a) p. 121) 
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were swept away. Our current knowledge of the tides, Whewell 
continued, is similar to this hypothetical state of affairs: there is no 
systematically arranged body of tidal data and no theoretical 
synthesis of the phenomenon of the tides, on par with physical 
astronomy, i.e. “[i]t has not been shown, by any author, that the 
general course of the effects produced upon the tides, by the 
changes of position and distance of the heavenly bodies, is such as, 
according to the mathematical reasoning, it ought to be” (Whewell, 
1834a, p. 17). Up until the mid-nineteenth century, the laws 
connecting the tides with the motions and distances of the sun and 
the moon were not known for any single port. Moreover, as 
Whewell lamented: 
 
Our philosophers assert, without hesitation, that this phenomenon 
is the result of the law of universal gravitation of matter; yet no one 
has hitherto deduced, from this law, the laws by which the 
phenomena are actually regulated with regards to time and place. 
(ibid., p. 15 [italics added]) 
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Whewell’s concern fits nicely with Isaac Newton’s dual 
methodology (cf. Ducheyne, 2005a and 2005b). In The Opticks 
(first edition: 1704) Newton wrote that the main business of natural 
philosophy is first “to argue from Phænomena without feigning 
Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects”  (Newton, 1979 
[1730], p. 369) and next to assume “the Causes discover’d and 
establich’d as Principles, and by them explaining the phaenomena 
proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations” (ibid., p. 
405). In Query 31 he wrote:  
 
As in Mathematics, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of 
difficult Things by the method of Analysis, ought ever to precede 
the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making 
Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general 
Conclusions from them by Induction, and admitting of no 
Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are taken from 
Experiments, or other certain Truths. For hypotheses are not to be 
regarded in experimental Philosophy. […] By this way of Analysis 
we may proceed from Compounds to Ingredients, and from 
Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general, from 
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Effects to their Causes, and from particulars Causes to more 
general ones, till the Argument end in the most general. This is the 
Method of Synthesis: And the method of Synthesis consists in 
assuming the Causes discover’d and establich’d as Principles, and 
by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and 
proving the Explanations. (ibid., pp. 404-405)22 
 
Natural philosophy thus proceeds along two types of 
demonstrations: the first from effects to causes (the analysis); the 
second from causes to effects (the synthesis). After he had quoted 
Newton’s famous analysis-synthesis distinction in the Philosophy 
of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell noted that the Newtonian 
analysis consists of “exact observation and measurement”, 
“decomposition of facts”, “selection and explication of the 
appropriate conception” and the “colligation of facts”, while the 
Newtonian synthesis consist of “those steps of deductive reasoning, 
proceeding from the conception once assumed, which are requisite 
for the comparison of its consequences with the observed facts” 
(PIS, V, p. 278). The analysis, i.e. the derivation of the (primary) 
cause of the tides, had been provided, for Newton had established 
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by the theory of universal gravitation that the attractive forces of 
the sun and the moon produce a tide-generating force. However, it 
needed to be shown how the law of universal gravitation could 
account for concrete tidal phenomena. Newton’s account was a 
rude approximation of the matter (HIS, II, p. 135). According to 
Whewell, the synthetic counterpart in tidology was simply lacking: 
the contributing or counteracting causes were largely unknown 
(Whewell, 1831a, pp. 166-168). Newton’s theory, as it stood, had 
virtually no explanatory value in tidal research and was frequently 
inconsistent with observation (Reidy, 2008, p. 11). In fact, “the 
only way in which the assumptions [i.e. the explanation given for 
the tides by universal gravitation] could be justified would be our 
finding, from observation, that the laws of the facts are such, or 
nearly so, as these calculations give” (Whewell, 1834a, p. 16). 
Whewell’s intention was thus to call attention to local and specific 
conditions which, in conjunction with the law of universal 
gravitation, produce the broad myriad of tidal phenomena. If such 
“initial conditions” or “contributing causes” could be treated 
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systematically, then we could establish a true and complete 
synthesis of the tides, i.e. we have deduced tidal phenomena from 
universal gravitation. It was this goal that Whewell in the early 
1830s sought to accomplish in tidology. 
 
 
3. Whewell’s Thoughts on The Process of Induction before his 
Tidal Research 
 
In a letter to Richard Jones written in 1833 Whewell claimed 
that the phenomena of the tides could nicely be accommodated by 
his philosophy and methodology of inductive science: 
 
This being so, I am meditating the returning forthwith and in 
earnest to my beloved Induction. I have been employed all the term 
hitherto upon a thumping23 paper of mine on the Tides, which I 
intend to be a step of some consequence in the theory. I wish I 
could explain to you how useful my philosophy is in shewing me 
how to set about a matter like this, and how good a subject this one 
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of the Tides is to exemplify it. (Whewell to Richard Jones, 31 
October 1833, CW, XVI, p. 172) 
 
Now, what were his views on induction at that time? In what way 
did he (or could he) think that his “beloved Induction” was useful 
for tidal research? The answers can be found, I argue, in Whewell’s 
notebooks on induction (composed between 1830 and 1833; class-
marks: WP, R.18.175-15). These notebooks on induction were 
written “with the object of discovering what are the processes by 
which their advance to this state of completeness has been 
↓brought about↓, the conditions by which advance was secured, the 
faculties of man which it has called into plan” (WP, R.18.178, f. 1r 
[entry dated December 1833]). Whewell sought to establish the 
conditions under which science is successful (ibid., f. 4r) and to 
renovate Bacon’s ideas on induction (ibid., f. 6r, f. 7r, f. 8r ). He 
stressed that our ability to know the natural world and to make 
inductive generalisations depends on universal principles (e.g. the 
notions of space, time, and cause) which reside in the constitution 
of the mind and which regulate all our perceptions. Whewell wrote: 
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“Phænomena are incapable of being received without being 
subordinated to regulative and interpretative conceptions.” (WP, 
R.18.1715, f. 56r [dated 1831-1832]).  Knowledge thus implies both 
passive as well as active thought: “collection of impressions” and 
“the operations of the reason” (WP, R.18.178, f. 19r). The actions 
of the mind work on impressions provided by the senses (ibid., f. 
36v.). Whewell noted that by using language “we do not expose 
our impressions only, but expose them modified and transformed 
by the operations of our thoughts” (WP, R.18.177, p. 23 [dated 
1830-1833]), so that human minds are “perpetually exercising a 
formative and productive power” (ibid., p. 24.), which is “exercised 
upon the rude material” (ibid., p. 41.). Such principles, which “are 
part of the original furniture of the common or unsystematic 
reason” (ibid., p. 14) and which spell out “↓universal↓ and familiar 
modes of contemplating objects” (ibid., p. 18), have been brought 
to light and systematized during the course of human history. 
According to Whewell, “sound and real physical science consists in 
apprehending a general fact of observation by means of ↓distinct↓ 
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ideas” (ibid., p. 61, also p.  63). Whewell warned that he did not 
use the term “idea” in its customary sense and noted that “the ideas 
of which I have to speak are general notions of relation, connexion, 
dependence, by which ↓such↓ conceptions are combined with one 
another” (ibid., p. 61.). Whewell sought to unravel “the general 
fundamental convictions and laws” underlying human reasoning 
and science (WP, R.18.178, p. 12). His aim was to show how these 
laws or principles gave rise to sound scientific knowledge: 
 
Our object is to ascertain the ↓general↓ laws which govern the 
formation and progress of knowledge in the largest sense; And 
the course which we purpose to follow leads us to examine their 
↓laws↓ in the first place, as they have operated in those branches 
of human knowledge which more peculiarly termed Sciences, 
and in which the certainty and progressive character of our 
knowledge are most striking and incontestable. […] Science may 
be ↑for our purpose↑ described as speculative knowledge of 
general truths. (ibid., p. 84) 
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In a very schematic way Whewell pointed out what the 
“Steps in the Method of Induction” are. According to Whewell’s 
first attempt at classification, the process of induction consists of 
four consecutive steps: 
 
I. Primary Induction from Particulars. 
II. Initiation of Primary Induction.  
III. Successive Generalisations. 
IV. Redescent to particulars from Principles established by 
Induction. (WP, R.18.1711, f. 1r [dated 1830-1833]) 
 
Steps I to III refer to the analytical part of science: the 
establishment of general principles.24 In steps I and II we make 
inductive generalisation from particulars. By combining different 
generalisations from particulars we arrive at successive 
generalisation, i.e. generalisations with a larger domain of 
application and, ultimately, at the most general principle. Step IV 
refers to the synthetic part: the derivation of other particulars 
(originally not included in the analysis) from the most general 
principles we have established. Whewell only further commented 
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on step I: he noted that this step presupposes “Regulative 
Conceptions” or “Conditions of Inductivity” such as space, time, 
motion (a combination of space and time), order, cause and effect, 
resemblance, opposition-contrariety, and elementary composition 
(WP, R.18.1711, f. 1r). In another notebook, we can trace 
Whewell’s second and somewhat more developed – but still very 
sketchy – attempt at classifying the process of induction (this entry 
is dated on 22 July 1831). There he divided the process of 
induction in “Experimental physics or Sciences of Experiment”25 
as follows: 
 
1 Common observation and Collection of Phenomena/Instances, 
occasional occurrences 
2. decomposition of phenomena and Perception of simpler 
connexions 
3 Insulation of facts and Terminology26 (technical) 
4 Insulated experiments [i.e. systematic experiment and measure of 
insulated facts (WP, R.18.1715, f. 39r)] 
5 Induction 1 Laws of Phenomena. 
6 Induction 2 Causes of Laws (ibid., f. 39v) 
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According to the division suggested by Whewell, the process of 
induction proceeds as follows. The first step is observation of 
particulars. Such observations then suggest various ways of 
decomposing phenomena mentally into simpler relations. On step 2, 
the “Decomposition of Facts”, he added that at this stage the 
decomposition is conjectural, but once we come to experiment we 
no longer decompose phenomena in our thought but in reality 
(ibid.). Facts are decomposed “either into ↓conclusions↓, or into 
simpler connexions” (ibid.). He also wrote “[i]f this conjectural law 
is false, try another, and alter the terms if necessary” (ibid.). In the 
next step, we give technical terms to these decomposed phenomena. 
To test whether a mental decomposition corresponds to reality we 
have to perform a systematic experiment and thus to quantify the 
components of the phenomenon under consideration. If this 
decomposition turns out correct then we have established a law of 
phenomena. Once we have further investigated the laws of 
phenomena it is possible that we are able to penetrate further into 
the causes of these empirical regularities. In step 5 and step 6 
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Whewell distinguished between induction of laws of phenomena 
(induction 1) and induction of laws of causes (induction 2).27 On 
step 6 he noted that “The highest step of science is the knowledge 
of causes” (WP, R.18.1715, f. 43r). It is reasonable to suggest then 
that, when Whewell wrote to Richard Jones in 1833, he thought 
that proceeding along these six consecutive steps could be useful to 
deal with the problem of the tides. Careful study of Whewell’s 
notebooks on induction reveals that Whewell’s views on scientific 
methodology were still quite rudimentary before he actively 
embarked in tidal research. 28  It is precisely my claim that 
Whewell’s active involvement in tidology contributed in arriving at 
the more detailed and elaborated methodological views he spelled 
out in the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 
In his early notebooks, Whewell’s thoughts about induction 
were still very much under-construction and quite vague. Therein 
he did not elaborate much on the details of the process of induction. 
Neither, did he raise important methodological issues such as 
hypothesis-testing, consilience of inductions or the quantitative 
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methods involved in induction. In the Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences, i.e. after the period in which most of his tidal research 
appeared in print, this would change. 
In his 1830-1833 notebooks Whewell thus gave attention to 
both inductive method and the (regulative) conceptions provided 
by the mind29, pace Fisch who claims that Whewell only became 
concerned with epistemological issues after the appearance of the 
first edition of the History of the Inductive Sciences and that 
Whewell’s transcendental turn appeared between 1837 and 1839 
(Fisch, 1991b, p. 37, p. 62, p. 64, pp. 64-65). Yeo has also pointed 
to Whewell’s 1820s interest in matters of inductive philosophy 
(Yeo, 1993, p. 62), as did Harvey W. Becher who points out that 
“Whewell, at the latest, from 1814, read, discussed, and understood 
Locke, Berkeley, and the Scottish Common Sense School; at the 
latest, in the mid-1820s encountered Kant, and from the first, based 
his mechanics on a division between contingent and a priori  
truths” (Becher, 1992, p. 382). Furthermore, in view of such 
regulative conceptions, Fisch’ claim that Whewell’s six-step 
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scheme of the inductive method was “orthodox Baconian” (in the 
sense of hardcore empiricist) (Fisch, 1991b, p. 54) needs to be 
taken cum grano salis, for (1) Bacon was hardly a hardcore 
empiricist himself and (2) the content of the Whewell’s 1830-1833 
notebooks and his review of Herschel’s Discourse belie such 
reading.30  This further renders Fisch’s erotetic reconstruction of 
Whewell’s philosophy doubtful. Also Fisch’s contention that 
Whewell in 1834 introduced a radically new concept of induction, 
induction as superinduction (Fisch, 1991b, pp. 58-59), is hampered 
by the fact that Whewell in his review of Herschel’s Discourse 
wrote that induction “does more than Observation, inasmuch as she 
not only collects facts, but catches some connexion or relation 
among them” (Whewell, 1831b, p. 379; cf. Whewell’s letter to 
Richard Jones on 19 February 1832, CW, XVI, p. 141; Yeo, 1989).  
 
 
4. Connecting Whewell’s Tidal Research and his Philosophical 
Methodology31 
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In 1833 Whewell declared to John Herschel that he was 
going “to do something about the tides” and asked him to send his 
opinion on whether the propagation of a tide-wave as a hydro-
dynamical phenomenon could be accepted as an approximation to a 
real case “on the common suppositions [i.e. by equilibrium-
theory]” (Whewell to Herschel, 14 January 1833, CW, XVI, 153). 
In the same year, Whewell’s first research paper on the tides was 
published and with this paper Whewell’s “hunt” for the tides began. 
In his first papers on the tides, Whewell began sketching the 
problem at stake and pointed to the insufficiency of the available 
tidal theories. Whewell commented that the lack of proper theory 
of the tides derives from: the virtual absence of unified and 
interpreted data – according to Whewell, uninterpreted data only 
led to confusion (Becher, 1991, pp. 6-7) – and from the 
problematic presuppositions underlying contemporary tidal theories. 
In 4.1 a brief outline of Whewell’s main contributions to tidology 
is provided; in 4.2 and 4.3 I shall connect Whewell’s tidology with 
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his philosophical-methodological work. In 4.3 Whewell’s views of 
the theoretical status of equilibrium-theory and theory confirmation 
are discussed. 
 
4.1. Whewell’s “hunt” for the tides32 
 
With respect to lack of observational data, Whewell 
commented that the specifics on how universal gravitation causes 
the tides are absent 33 : “even up to the present day this general 
explanation has not been pursued into its results in detail, so as to 
show its bearing on the special phenomena of particular places, – to 
connect the actual tides of all different parts of the world, – and to 
account for their varieties and seeming anomalies” (Whewell, 1833, 
p. 147 [italics added]). He complained that few data are publicly 
accessible, since most of them have been “kept as secrets, and 
handed down as private property from one generation to another” 
(Whewell, 1834a, p. 16). As the history of science had shown 
(especially the development of astronomy), the rendering public of 
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observational tables and the confrontation of data with theory were 
the most speedily ways to establish a true theory (ibid., p. 40; cf. 
Reidy, 2008, pp. 230-232, pp. 242-243).  Whewell commented as 
follows: 
 
And thus the study of the tides might be pursued, and, to do the 
subject justice, ought to be pursued, in the same manner as the 
study of the other provinces of astronomy: that is, constant and 
careful observations should be made of the phenomena; and, as 
fast as they are made, should be reduced and discussed at the 
public expense; so as to test the accuracy of the tables already 
obtained, and to supply the means of making them still more 
accurate. (Whewell, 1838a, p. 232) 
 
He noted that although some local tidal phenomena had been 
studied, “no one appears to have attempted to trace the nature of the 
connexion among the tides of different parts of the world” leaving 
our knowledge of the tides “very imperfect and doubtful” Whewell, 
1833, p. 148 [italics added], p. 219). In other words, tidal 
observations have not been properly generalized (ibid., p. 148). 
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Unravelling the universal patterns of the tides was Whewell’s main 
interest (Deacon, 1971, p. 256). Collecting accurate observations of 
tidal phenomena was paramount in order to deduce the proper 
theory of the tides. The larger the bulk of observations, the more 
accurate the harvested results will be. As an example of this, 
Whewell pointed to Lubbock’s 1831 paper on the tides where 
“above 13,000 observations, extending through nineteen years” 
were collected (PIS, V, p. 407). 
Whewell’s aim was to make the first steps towards 
unravelling the empirical laws of the tides, before making any 
assertions about the (contributing) causes producing the tides. In one 
of his notebooks (1835), he wrote that the tides “are not a normal 
specimen because the general course is known [i.e. the primary 
cause by the force of gravity]” but still we have “to trace the laws of 
phenomena [i.e. the local contributing causes] as if the laws of 
causation were not known – and having got laws of certain phenom. 
we get universal phenom” (WP, R.18.1114, f. 37v, f. 38r). Whewell 
compared the present state of knowledge of the tides to the pre-
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Newtonian state in astronomy: “[w]hen we consider the enormous 
accumulation of observed phenomena and empirical laws which 
preceded the discovery of the true principles of the heavenly motion, 
we may easily suppose that we are only on the outset of what we 
have to do, in order to obtain the same success with regard to the 
tides” (Whewell, 1834a, p. 40). As we have seen, Whewell stated in 
his notebooks on induction that the establishment of empirical laws 
precedes the investigation of causes. In the Philosophy of the 
Inductive Science he upheld the same distinction between empirical 
and causal inductions: scientific laws are either empirical laws or 
“Laws of Phenomena” (which teach us what takes place), or causal 
laws or “Theories of Causes” (which explain why it takes place34) 
(PIS, V, pp. 95-106, p. 336; cf. NOR, VI, pp. 118-128.). Few 
branches of science are able to unravel the causes of things. In 
manuscript material dated between ca. 1837-1840 relating to the 
History of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell wrote that in order to 
tackle the problem of the tides we should “ascertain by an analysis 
of long series of observations, the effect of changes in the time of 
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transit, parallax, and declination of the moon, and thus to obtain the 
laws of phenomena; and then to proceed to ↓investigate↓ the laws of 
causation” (WP, R.18.132, f. 278v). 
Accurate tide tables – the earliest ones were produced for the 
ports of Liverpool and London – formed the necessary point of 
departure for establishing a theory of tidal phenomena: only careful 
observations could yield insight in patterns and accidental causes 
could be filtered out by “taking so great a number of observations”, 
so that “the effects thus produced will depend upon the depth of the 
ocean, the form of its shores, and other causes, of which it is 
impossible to estimate the result à priori”  (Whewell, 1834a, p. 18, 
pp. 17-18, cf. p. 43; cf. Whewell, 1836c, pp. 238-336, p. 290). 
Initially Whewell was quite optimistic in this respect (cf. Becher, 
1991, p. 14) as can be seen from a letter concerning the tides in the 
port of London where he wrote John W. Lubbock in 1833: “I shall 
get formulæ which will represent your tables very well, and I am 
persuaded that I can calculate tide tables from my formulæ, which 
will agree with observation as well as any extant tables or better” 
 31 
(Whewell to J.W. Lubbock, 31 October 1833, CW, XVI, p. 169).35 
Likewise, in his first paper on the tides (1833), Whewell noted: “If, 
with the opportunities which now exist, observations are for the 
future made with due attention to the circumstances of real 
importance, we may in a very few years be able to draw a map of 
cotidal lines36  with certainty and accuracy” (Whewell, 1833, p. 148 
[italics added]). In his paper on the tides at Liverpool (1836), he 
noted that the obtained measures pointed directly to a very simple 
law of the tides “namely, that the tide at any place occurs in the 
same way as if the ocean imitated the form of equilibrium 
corresponding to a certain antecedent time” (Whewell, 1836a, p. 2). 
It is highly likely, Whewell suggested, that other ports “might be 
represented in a similar manner” (ibid., p. 6). Equilibrium-theory 
thus expresses “with very remarkable exactness, most of the 
circumstance in my results” (ibid., p. 2; cf. Whewell, 1838a, p. 233); 
moreover, he added “notwithstanding the great irregularities to 
which the tides are subject, the results of the means of the large 
masses of good observations agree with the formulæ with a 
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precision not far below that of other astronomical phenomena” 
(Whewell, 1836a, p. 2). In 1837, he claimed to have established “a 
rule, based on equilibrium theory, agreeing with the observations to 
an extraordinary degree and precision” and also that in some cases 
the “[diurnal] inequality assumes a very remarkable form, so as 
materially to disguise the general circumstances of the tides, and to 
explain other causes in which the usual features are entirely 
obliterated” (Whewell, 1837a, p. 75). 
In his 1834 paper on the tides at the port of London and his 
1836 paper on the tides at the port of Liverpool, Whewell tried to 
determine how the time of high-water and the height of the water 
are affected by the declinations and parallaxes of the sun and moon 
by equilibrium-theory. Equilibrium-theory states that the attractive 
forces of the sun and moon cause the ocean to approach the shape of 
a spheroid with its major axis (approximately) aligned so that the 
greatest elevations of water occur one below the moon and the other 
on the opposite side of the earth (Deacon, 1971, pp. 252-253). Here 
he relied on Lubbock’s 1832 paper in which Lubbock had found a 
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formula that accounted for the lunar inequalities: i.e. for both the 
correction of the moon’s declination (the semi-menstrual inequality), 
owing to the moon’s changing angular distance to the earth’s 
equator (which depends on the moon’s distance from the sun), and 
the correction of the moon’s parallax, owing to the fact that the 
moon’s distance to the earth is not constant37 (Whewell, 1834a, pp. 
19-27). Also the time of high-tide does not follow the moon’s transit 
by the same interval at every period of lunation. Therefore, Lubbock 
and Whewell did not consider the commonly used vulgar 
establishment, i.e. the time of high-water on the day of new and full 
moon at a place, but instead the corrected establishment, i.e. the 
average of all time-intervals between high-tide and the moon’s 
transit for any whole numbers of a half-lunation, i.e. the period 
required for the moon to pass from a position of maximum angular 
distance north of the equator to a position of maximum angular 
distance south of the equator (or conversely) (Whewell, 1833, p. 
163). 38  The corrected establishment is thus basically the vulgar 
establishment freed from the age of the tide and the lunar 
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inequalities.39 Lubbock’s equation for the semi-menstrual inequality 
stated the following relation: tan 2 (θ'– λ') = – [h sin 2 (φ – α) / h' 
cos 2 (φ – α)], where λ' is the mean interval of the tide and transit, θ' 
is the correct interval, φ is the solar time of the moon’s transit, α is a 
constant quantity (for London 2 hours) and h and h' are the 
elevations of the spheroid due to the moon and the sun. This 
formula assumes that the waters of the ocean approach nearly the 
form in which they would appear in equilibrium under the action of 
the sun and the moon and that the pole of the fluid follows the pole 
of the spheroid of equilibrium at a certain distance (Whewell, 1834a, 
35). It also assumes that the earth and the moon are at rest (WP, 
R.6.2024, f. 102r). Whewell then went on to further incorporate the 
solar corrections (and the heights of high tide) (Whewell, 1834a, p. 
34; Reidy, 2008, p. 152).40 The tide tables for Liverpool and London 
suggested a confirmation of Whewell’s formulae (Whewell, 1834a, 
p. 34; Whewell, 1836b, p. 131). The results showed that, Whewell 
claimed, “notwithstanding the great irregularities to which the tides 
are subject, the results of the means of large masses of good 
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observations agree with the formulæ with a precision not far below 
that of other astronomical data”  (Whewell, 1836a, p. 2). By 
comparing the initial results of the port of London with those of the 
port of Liverpool, the formula for the port of London could further 
be tested and improved on (ibid., pp. 1-2). More precisely, Whewell 
had shown that the tides at the ports of London and Liverpool 
subsumed under the same mathematical formula, once different 
constants for λ' and α are filled in. Such constants (magnitudes and 
epochs) are not derived from equilibrium theory and can only be 
established empirically as they differ from location to location 
(Whewell, 1837a, pp. 76-77). This put an end to the hope that tide 
tables for one port could be used to determine the tides at another 
port by simply adding or subtracting a constant interval (Reidy, 
2008, p. 175). 
Once Whewell had collected tidal data for several coasts in 
Great Britain and Ireland he moved on to acquire the times and 
heights of high- and low-water on a global scale. To that end, 
directions were given to make observations throughout the world – 
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in a research paper published in 1836 he reported on “this large 
experiment” (Whewell, 1836c; cf. Whewell, 1834b). These 
observations were, as Whewell stressed, made for the most part 
“under the direction of intelligent officers and men of science” 
(Whewell, 1836c, p. 289). Whewell’s aim was to deduce corrected 
cotidal lines, i.e. lines which connect places at which high-tide 
occurs at equal times, from this vast collection of data. For the 
reduction of the data he had used, according to his own testimony 
(Whewell to Herschel, 10 June 1836, CW, XVI, p. 242), John 
Herschel’s method of graphical interpolation41 and the method of 
means. The obtained data however showed that the cotidal lines of 
the North Sea are much distorted resulting in rotary systems of tide-
waves – a further sign that equilibrium-theory alone was insufficient 
(Whewell, 1836c, p. 298).42 Moreover, the results for the Atlantic 
were so complicated that he abandoned any attempt to trace cotidal 
lines for the oceans as a whole (see Figures 1 and 2) (Deacon, 1971, 
p. 263; Reidy, 2008, p. 181). Around that period Whewell wrote to 
Herschel: “the longer I attend to the subject [i.e. the tides], the more 
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cautious I become in generalising” (Whewell to Herschel, 4 
December 1836, CW, XVI, p. 247). Instead of trying to correct the 
cotidal lines any further, he started a worldwide study on the diurnal 
inequality, i.e. the difference between the heights of the two high-
tides (or of two low-tides) on the same day (Whewell, 1837a; Reidy, 
2008, p. 208). Calling attention to the daily inequality was of utmost 
importance: by emphasising its locality, Whewell made it clear that 
local observations were badly needed (cf. his statement that “[t]he 
peculiarities of the tides in each country are such as to make each 
shore a study by itself” (Whewell, 1837b, p. 233). Therefore, he 
called attention to the need of making tidal investigations “a 
national work in civilised maritime states” so that “our best 
generalizations will be collected from results obtained in separate 
parts and combined”  (Whewell, 1837b, p. 233).43 
 
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HEREABOUTS] 
 
4.2. “The Construction of Science” 
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Whewell’s method of reducing tidal phenomena into more 
manageable components nicely fits with his methodological views 
as described in Book XI, entitled “Of the Construction of Science”, 
of Volume II of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. From the 
Fundamental Antithesis of Philosophy 44 , which states that 
knowledge always involves both “Thoughts and Things” 45 , it 
follows that the establishment of proper, i.e. scientific, knowledge is 
based on “clear and certain facts” on the one hand and on 
appropriate conceptions that are applied to those facts on the other 
hand (PIS, IV, p. 4). The progress of science, according to Whewell, 
was only possible by the fruitful combination of metaphysics and 
experience: “the metaphysical is a necessary part of the inductive 
movement” (ibid., IV, ix). Consequently, the progress of science has 
its place in observation, in appropriate ideas (which regulate our 
active operations of the mind (ibid., IV, p. 66)), and in the union of 
the two (ibid., IV, ix). The starting point of the process of induction 
is, according to Whewell, the decomposition of facts:  
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We resolve complex appearances which nature offers to us, and the 
mixed and manifold modes of looking at these appearances which 
rise in our thoughts, into limited, definite, and clearly-understood 
portions. […] The Decomposition of Facts into Elementary Facts, 
clearly understood and surely ascertained, must precede all 
discovery of the laws of nature.  (ibid., V, pp. 33-34) 
 
This process results in the introduction of technical terms by 
which such “Elementary Facts” are described (e.g. altitude, 
declination, refraction, etc.) (ibid., V, p. 34; NOR, VI, pp. 257-345). 
Once we have settled the terminology we can begin measuring such 
decomposed facts. And indeed, when studying the tides, Whewell 
reduced the complex motion of the oceans (and the relevant changes 
accompanying it) into less complex and more easily determinable 
components such as the heights and times of high-water or the 
positions and motion of the sun and the moon. To such elementary 
facts technical names were given (“vulgar” or “corrected 
establishment”, “parallax”, or “declination”) and they were 
subsequently measured at specific ports at specific times. The next 
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steps in the formation of science are the Explication of Concepts 
and the Colligation of Facts, respectively (PIS, V, p. 5; cf. NOR, VI, 
p. 29, pp. 30-49, pp. 59-69). The former refers to the fact that Ideas 
(such as the ideas of space, time, cause, number, etc.) are 
transformed into special modifications, so called “conceptions”, of 
those ideas (such as force, circle, squared number, genus, etc.) 
which are then applicable to particular facts (PIS, V, pp. 5-6). In this 
process we clarify our ideas, i.e. we render them more concrete 
(ibid., V, p. 18). In the course of scientific research we try to 
“unfold” conceptions “so as to bring into clear view the elements of 
truth with which they are marked from their ideal origin” (ibid., V, p. 
6). Colligation of Facts occurs, when several separate facts are 
bound together by the same conception (ibid., V, p. 36; cf. NOR, VI, 
p. 70 (Aphorism VIII)).46 Induction is not merely the sum of the 
individual facts (as Mill would claim): known facts are seen from a 
novel point of view, which did not exist in any of the observed facts 
previously (PIS, V, p. 49, p. 85; cf. NOR, VI, pp. 71-72; cf. PD, VII, 
p. 20). When Kepler discovered the elliptic orbit of planets, for 
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instance, he applied the concept of ellipse to the motion of Mars. As 
Whewell put it, a conception is super-induced upon the facts (PIS, 
V, p. 50; cf. NOR, VI, p. 74). As we have seen, Whewell was 
particularly interested in unfolding the connexion between tidal 
observations. A “cotidal line” was the conception by which 
Whewell hoped that tidal observations could be bound together.47 
While the under-labourers merely collected tidal data, the 
“scientists” colligated them. 
 
4.3. Theory-testing and confirmation 
 
Although there is no doubt of Whewell’s immense 
appreciation of Lubbock’s work, he wanted to go beyond what 
Lubbock was doing (Reidy, 2008, pp. 130-133, p. 152, p. 165, p. 
167). Instead of pursuing with long-time local observations, 
Whewell wanted to obtain short-time comparative simultaneous 
data from around the world which could then serve as a means to 
establish plausible theoretical generalizations. Confronting theory 
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with data was a vital goal of his tidal research (Ruse, 1976, p. 233). 
According to Whewell, tidal theories had not been properly tested: 
“the laws which these methods imply have not yet been compared 
with theory” (Whewell, 1834a, p. 16, note *). Whewell endorsed the 
view that in our attempt to explain the tides, we should combine 
“the hydrostatic effect of the currents with the laws of transmitted 
undulations” (Whewell, 1833, p. 227). 
Hypotheses are easily devised, but not easily confirmed. The 
process of testing and confirming a theoretical hypothesis takes 
decades, if not centuries (e.g. universal gravitation). Without proper 
testing and verification a colligation of facts has only the status of a 
hypothesis (PIS, V, p. 44). According to Whewell, testing 
hypothesis is a step-by-step process: “we resolve the most general 
truths in to their constituent parts; and these again into their parts; 
and by testing, at each step, both the reality of the asserted 
ingredients and the propriety of the conjunction, we establish the 
whole system of truths” (ibid., V, p. 80). It we are successful in this 
respect our hypothesis has been “penetrated, infiltrated, and 
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metamorphosed by the surrounding medium of truth, before the 
merely arbitrary and erroneous residuum has been finally ejected 
out of the body of permanent and certain knowledge” (Whewell, 
1856, p. 146 [this paper was presented in 1851]). When testing the 
equilibrium-theory Whewell proceeded in exactly this way: the 
formula for the semi-menstrual inequality devised by Lubbock and 
the cotidal lines were based on equilibrium-theory and thus could 
serve as an indirect way to confirm or falsify equilibrium-theory. In 
his first tidal reports, Whewell set out to confront this formula with 
observation. When it was confirmed from the observations of the 
port of London, he immediately went on to test it for the port of 
Liverpool. The generalizations for both ports matched and thus a 
consilience of inductions was established which gave Lubbock’s 
formula and equilibrium-theory extra credit. A hypothesis’ ability 
to provide consilience of inductions is a test of its truth, according 
to Whewell (Laudan, 1981; Fisch, 1985a). In the history of science 
only two theories displayed an extraordinary capacity to establish 
(the strong version of) consilience of inductions: universal 
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gravitation and the wave theory of light (HIS, II, p. 310, p. 328, p. 
341, p. 429, p. 459, p. 464; ibid., III, p. 22).  
Whewell distinguished between two versions of consilience 
of inductions: (1) a strong version which refers to the unification (or 
“jumping together”) of two inductive generalisations involving 
classes of facts of different kinds; and (2) weaker version which 
refers to the unification of two inductive generalisations involving 
classes of facts of the same kind (PIS, V, p. 65). The jumping 
together of the data obtained for the ports of London and Liverpool 
constituted a consilience in the weak sense, as both were based on 
littoral data. A consilience of the strong type would refer to the 
jumping together of littoral and oceanic data – a requirement shown 
to be impossible in Whewell’s later tidal research. Proper scientific 
theories are the result of such process of successive generalizations 
and tend increasingly toward simplicity.48 However, as it turned out, 
Whewell’s cotidal lines were rendered doubtful in view of the 
world-wide observations he later reported on. In manuscript 
material dated between ca. 1837-1840 relating to the History of the 
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Inductive Sciences, Whewell recorded: “The hypotheses which 
connect facts in space are most easily devised; yet even then are 
often difficult. but are needed. Ex. Cotidal Lines” (WP, R.18.1020(3), 
f. 8r). In the same manuscript material he wrote: “The fear of 
hypothesis leads to inaction: the better philosophy leads to such 
experiments as may show what is the true hypothesis” (ibid., f. 8v). 
As an obvious sneer at Newton’s hypotheses non fingo, he noted 
“Hypotheses may be framed to connect measured phenomena” 
(ibid., f. 11r; NOR, VI, p. 82). According to Whewell, clearly 
conceived hypotheses can be useful to arrive at “the true rule”, i.e. 
the rule that is consistent with all observed facts (PIS, V, p. 60; cf. 
HIS, I, p. 141). This, as we have seen, was frequently brought up by 
Whewell’s tidal papers. In his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
Whewell stressed the importance of conjectural leaps in scientific 
practice: “To try wrong guesses is, with most persons, the only way 
to hit the right. The character of a true philosopher is, not that he 
never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures are clearly 
conceived49, and brought into rigid contact with facts” (PIS, p. 55 
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[italics added]; cf. NOR, VI, p. 80). He added to this that a true 
philosopher should “abandon his invention as soon as it appears that 
it does not agree with the course of actual occurrences” (PIS, V, p. 
56). This is exactly what Whewell did in his post-1836 reports on 
the tides and more explicitly in his Bakerian Lecture (see infra).50 
Besides collecting and generalizing data (which results in 
establishing empirical laws), Whewell was mostly interested in 
comparing obtained data with theory and in potentially establishing 
the correct theory. With respect to the theoretical apparatus required 
to tackle the problems of the tides, Whewell noted that there were 
two different approaches available: (1) equilibrium theory as 
developed by Newton and especially Bernouilli who “have assumed 
the form of the fluid spheroid, under the influence of the sun and 
moon, to be the form of equilibrium” (Whewell, 1834a, p. 16) and 
(2) oscillatory theory as developed by Laplace who has treated “the 
tides as a problem of the oscillations” (Whewell, 1833, p. 147) 
(while supposing the whole globe to be covered with water of an 
uniform depth). On the former option he noted that the waters of the 
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seas cannot be considered at rest “and therefore the form of the 
surfaces is not that of equilibrium” (ibid., p. 218; cf. Whewell, 
1836c, 304) and that Laplace’s theory is undoubtedly “the correct 
view of the real operation of the forces51; but it does not appear that 
in this way he has obtained any consequences to which NEWTON’s 
mode of considering the subject did not lead with equal certainty 
and greater simplicity” (Whewell, 1833, p. 147).52 “[I]t is physically, 
not only possible,” wrote Whewell, “but certain, that each 
oscillation in each series is affected by those which precede it in the 
same series, and affects those which succeed it, so that their relative 
magnitude is different from what it would otherwise be” (Whewell, 
1834a, p. 43). Although mathematicians (including Laplace) have 
tried to show that some laws of fact agree with the measurements 
predicted by theory, no one has so far shown that “the general 
course of the effects produced upon the tides, by the changes of 
position and distance of the heavenly bodies is such as, according to 
the mathematical reasoning, it should be” (ibid., p. 17). 
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Whewell was quite aware that the standard equilibrium theory 
was “not the true theory, but a very inaccurate and insufficient 
substitute for it, which we are compelled to adopt in consequence of 
the extremely imperfect state of the mathematical science of 
hydrodynamics” since the “tides are a problem of motion, not of 
equilibrium of fluids; and we can never fully explain the 
circumstances of the phenomena till the problem has been solved in 
its genuine form” Whewell, 1836b, p. 134; cf. Whewell, 1838a, p. 
233).53 Nevertheless, using an incorrect, though clearly conceived 
working-hypothesis which is at least to some degree based on 
observation, could be useful to suggest a better one (Whewell to 
Airy, 18 January 1843, CW, XVI, p. 307). In 1836 he wrote: “The 
laws of the tides, thus empirically obtained, may be used either as 
tests of the extant theories, or as suggestions for the improvement of 
those portions of mathematical hydraulics on which the true theory 
must depend.” (Whewell, 1834a, p. 19). The problem of the tides is 
a problem “not of hydrostatics, but one hydrodynamics. But the 
extreme difficulty of a hydrodynamical problem of such complexity 
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and generality, as this must be, long frightened analysts away from 
it.” (WP, R.18.104, f. 5r ).  
Let me now clarify why Whewell thought that pursuing 
equilibrium-theory rather than hydrodynamics as it stood was the 
best option to track the true theory. This point has often baffled 
scholars. For instance, Micheal Ruse noted that: “To be honest, the 
reason why Whewell took this course [of opting for equilibrium-
theory] was probably in major part due to personal inadequacy; he 
admitted that he lacked the mathematical skills demanded by the 
hydrodynamical approach” (Ruse, 1991, p. 96; cf. Ruse, 1976, pp. 
235-236). This ad hoc explanation holds no grounds, for it can be 
shown that Whewell’s preference for equilibrium-theory was 
motivated by his views on theory testing. Neither is Ruse’s 
observation correct that Whewell “did not extend his discussion of 
models, for he gave no real guide-lines for when they should be 
used and when abandoned, and which model rather than another 
should be preferred” (Ruse, 1976, p. 235).54 Whewell never thought 
that Laplace’s account is appealing since it involves laborious 
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computations, but worse, the hypothesis on which his solution is 
based affects the results “so as to make them differ altogether from 
those of the real case” (Whewell, 1833, p. 35). Margaret Deacon 
commented as follows on Whewell’s preference for equilibrium 
theory: 
 
He did not however believe that Laplace’s work as it stood offered 
a way of explaining the tides at large that did the Newton-
Bernoulli equilibrium theory. Apart from his tidal and other 
original studies Whewell was on of the first historians of science 
and he understood that a hypothesis which could be examined 
empirically was likely to be a more rewarding field of inquiry than 
a theory which could not develop, even though he felt that the 
ultimate answers must lie in that direction. (Deacon, 1971, p. 258)  
 
Whewell noted that “[t]ide tables were never, I believe, 
calculated upon Laplace’s theory, and thus never fairly brought to 
the test” (WP, R.18.132, f. 278v).55 Furthermore, Laplace’s theory 
rests on “arbitrary hypotheses” (Whewell, 1836b, p. 134): his theory 
rests on the supposition that the earth is uniformly covered with 
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water and hence does not take into account the existence of 
continents (by contrast, Newton’s theory leaves the depth of the 
oceans open) neither does it enable us to collect from it anything 
about the depth of the motion (moreover, it remained unclear what 
the mechanical principle is by which the tides are dependent on the 
depth of the ocean) (Whewell to Lyell, 5 March 1835, CW, XVI, p. 
207). Laplace also introduced the precarious assumption that in a 
system of bodies, in which periodical forces act, the state of the 
system is periodical like the forces (HIS, II, p. 92, p. 195). Later, in 
a letter to Airy in 1843, Whewell added that Laplace’s theory thus 
required “some general conjectural reasoning to bridge over the gap 
between the mathematical hypothesis and the case of nature” 
(Whewell to Airy, 2 March 1843, CW, XVI, p. 311). Snyder has 
rightfully called attention to an important, and often neglected, 
aspect of Whewell’s account of theory-testing: haphazardly framed 
hypotheses, i.e. hypotheses which are by no means inferable from 
the data at hand, cannot pass as candidates for Whewell’s 
consequentialist confirmation tests (prediction, consilience and 
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coherence) (Snyder, 1997b, p. 598, pp. 585-588; Snyder, 1997a, pp. 
167-176; Snyder, 2006, pp. 171-175). 56  A hypothesis worthy of 
consequentialist testing should (i) be clearly conceived, i.e. it should 
resolve the phenomenon involved into limited and definite portions 
(PIS, V, p. 33), and inferable from the actual observations, i.e. “not 
connected with them [actual observations] by other arbitrary and 
untried facts” or in other words “close to the facts” (ibid., V, p. 276, 
cf. p. 387; cf. NOR, VI, p. 183); furthermore, it (ii) should yield a 
colligation, derived from certain Fundamental Ideas, which binds 
these observations together while assigning a common property to 
them (PIS, V, p. 45; cf. NOR, VI, pp. 67-68). Furthermore, such 
property should also be projectable to yet unobserved facts – for an 
adequate hypothesis should explain all phenomena (PIS, V, p. 62). 
For Whewell scientific knowledge involved the combination of 
inductive discovery and deductive justification (Ruse, 1976, p. 
231).57 On Laplace’s account neither of the conditions mentioned 
above obtain: his account is not “close to the facts” (it simply 
explains the form and depth of the seabed away, instead of 
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attempting to account for such factors) nor does it make any 
predictions about new phenomena/evidence (Laplace had accounted 
for some observations at Brest, but had not predicted new data) 
(HIS, II, p. 191). Hence, Whewell’s criticism on Laplace’s theory: it 
did not make predictions of phenomena we have not yet observed, 
i.e. it did not have forward-looking capacity.58 Newton’s theory of 
universal gravitation has such capacity: “it pointed out an 
interminable vista of new facts, too minute or too complex for 
observation alone to disentangle, but capable of being detected 
when theory had pointed out their laws, and of the being used as 
criteria or confirmations of the truth of the doctrine” (ibid., II, p. 
136). A fruitful hypothesis should not only be able to explain the 
facts we hitherto observed, but also foretell phenomena which have 
not yet been observed (ibid., II, p. 62).59 Note also that equilibrium-
theory is a corollary of universal gravitation, the most severely 
tested and confirmed theory in the history of science – obviously a 
theory Whewell would not easily give up on. As tidology was a part 
of physical astronomy, it was inconceivable for Whewell not to cast 
   
54 
the problem of the tides in its genuine Newtonian framework (while 
leaving open the possibility that other theoretical elements needed to 
be added in order to get at the details of tidal phenomena). 
By contrast, equilibrium theory rests on the assumption that 
“a fluid will always tend to the condition of equilibrium, though the 
circumstances of the case prevent its ever reaching that condition; a 
very just and reasonable assumption” (Whewell to Airy, 18 January 
1843, CW, XVI, p. 307; cf. WP, R.18.132, f. 280r). So while 
equilibrium-theory supposed a tendency towards equilibrium (HIS, 
II, p. 195) (a tendency that could be and in fact is disturbed by 
additional parameters60), Laplace’s theory assumed an unrealistic 
idealization: that the earth is uniformly covered by a world ocean. 
Whewell was, however, doubtful whether equilibrium theory alone 
could provide the correct theoretical apparatus for tidal phenomena: 
he believed that equilibrium theory “in conjunction with the laws of 
waves, so far as we knew those waves” could result in a truer theory 
(Whewell to Airy, 22 February 1843, CW, XVI, p. 309). In a paper, 
entitled “An Essay on the Theory of the Tides”, that was read on 11 
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November 1839, he noted: “It is well known that though the 
equilibrium theory of the tides ↓as given by Bernoulli and others, 
with↓ when applied with certain modifications, account[s] for 
several of the phenomena, yet that taking the general progress of the 
tides into account ↓this theory↓ is irreconcilable with numerous 
facts, while at the same time it has no right on any mathematical 
grounds hitherto adduced to be considered now as an approximation 
to the truth” (WP, R.6.2024, f. 102r).61 In the same year he noted that 
the first approximation “has little or no real value” and that the other 
approximations are mere additions to the first (ibid., f. 131r). In a 
paper written in 1837, Whewell noted that the novel “mathematical 
hydraulics on which the true theory must depend” is yet to be 
established (Whewell, 1834a, p. 19). For almost a decade Whewell 
published little on the tides. In a letter to David Forbes in 1838, he 
wrote that he wished to wrap up his tide papers “for there really is 
no end of the work to which they lead” and that as far as the hydro-
dynamics involved he preferred to leave this “to bolder and stronger 
mathematicians” (Whewell to Forbes, 2 April 1838, CW, XVI, p. 
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269). In the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Whewell noted 
that tidology can at present not be advanced “because we cannot 
solve the requisite problems in the Integral Calculus” (PIS, V, xxiv). 
According to Whewell, not only was a new mathematical apparatus 
lacking, but also a new conception by which hydrostatics and 
hydrodynamics could be combined in a single conception. In a letter 
to Lubbock on 2 February 1839, it seems that Whewell almost gave 
up on the tides: “I myself cannot long continue to give to it the 
attention which I have long done, and I suppose you must be nearly 
in the same situation” (WP, O.15.47227). In a letter to Lubbock sent 
7 days later, he announced that he had no immediate intention of 
writing a “general view” about the tides as he admitted that he did 
not see his way well enough (Whewell to Lubbock, 9 February 1838, 
CW, XVI, p. 277).  
In later years, Whewell’s scepticism about the theoretical 
adequacy of his cotidal lines (which were based on equilibrium-
theory) became more and more apparent. In his Bakerian lecture 
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(published in 1848) in which Whewell looked back on his earlier 
work on the tides, he commented as follows: 
 
When I wrote my first memoir on the subject, our knowledge of 
the tides of that ocean [i.e. the Pacific] was so imperfect, that I did 
not even venture upon a first approximation to the cotidal lines. 
And I have since seen reason to believe that, not only for that 
ocean but for all large seas, the method of drawing cotidal lines 
which I formerly adopted, is very precarious. (Whewell, 1848, p. 1) 
 
Moreover, he added “I [now] conceive all attempts to draw 
such lines across a wide ocean by means of observations on its 
shores, must be altogether worthless. This applies beyond doubt to 
the Pacific Ocean and probably, taking other reasons into account, 
to the Atlantic as also” (Whewell, 1848, p. 2). The data at hand had 
rendered it very implausible that the tides in the Atlantic and Pacific 
could be conceived to be brought by a progressive wave travelling 
round the world which follows the moon (as the scheme of cotidal 
lines assumed) (ibid., p. 5). First of all, cotidal lines might be 
disturbed, as to obtain a convex form, by “stationary undulations”, 
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i.e. free undulations “depending on the dimensions of the fluid only” 
(ibid., p. 3).62 Furthermore, it is possible that a stationary undulation 
may be produced by cotidal lines revolving round a fixed centre, a 
so-called “point of no tide” (ibid., p. 5; Whewell, 1836c, p. 299)63 
(or “amphidromic point”64 as this was later called). Such “derivative 
waves” disturb the cotidal waves (Whewell, 1836b, pp. 149-156). 
Observations in the Atlantic and in the English Channel showed that 
no universal pattern in terms of cotidal lines existed (Whewell, 
1836c). Cotidal lines must be modified substantially in order to 
accommodate the phenomena (Whewell, 1848, pp. 3-4). Whewell 
pointed out that the forms of these cotidal lines are exaggerated “in 
order to make them confirm to our observations, so that lines near 
the shore are made clear and almost parallel to each other” 
(Whewell, 1836c, p. 294). Correspondingly, Whewell now stressed 
that they were “mere geometrical diagrams, not lines marking the 
progress of a wave by motions of the particular perpendicular to the 
line of the wave” (Whewell, 1848, p. 9; Whewell, 1851, p. 28). In 
other words, he broke with his earlier (realistic) stance on cotidal 
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lines. In his first paper on the tides, he had indeed tried to trace the 
course of the cotidal lines according to which the tide is actually 
propagated in the Ocean (Whewell, 1833, p. 156). On the apparent 
irregularities of the cotidal lines on the West Coast of America, 
Whewell noted in 1833 that these were at the time being the 
simplest forms he could trace from phenomena and that they “may 
very probably be in reality simpler than they are here represented” 
(ibid., p. 214, cf. p. 235). Nevertheless, Whewell continued, graphs 
of cotidal lines remain helpful in ascertaining patterns of regularity 
and could assist in obtaining laws from imperfect data (PIS, IV, pp. 
396-397; cf. Hankins, 2006, pp. 617-622). Cotidal lines may still be 
used “to represent, in the first instance, the results of the tide 
observations made at a series of places in the same seas; nor does it 
appear that there can be at present devised any better method of 
bringing tide observations into geographical combination” 
(Whewell, 1848, p. 9). They are intended “to average out 
irregularities in the observations and to be able to distinguish the 
various components of the tides visually” (Robson & Cannon, 1984, 
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p. 183). Whewell concluded his Bakerian lecture by pointing out 
that the difficulties with the tides suggest “the necessity of some 
new mode of conceiving that motion; a subject which I shall not 
here pursue” (Whewell, 1848, p. 29). This new mode would be a 
combination of equilibrium-theory and the theory of transmitted 
undulations. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Summarizing, we might say that on an empirical level, 
Whewell attempted to systematize and unify tidal data by means of 
tide tables and visual modes of representation. On a theoretical and 
methodological level, he made serious attempts to test how well 
equilibrium-theory, of which he became well aware of its 
limitations, could be reconciled with extant data. 
Here I have argued that: (1) Whewell’s tidology and 
philosophy of science interacted in a fundamental way (which 
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becomes obvious when we focus on issues such as: theory-testing, 
the use of hypotheses, the criteria of their usefulness, and 
consilience of inductions), (2) his tidal research was the source of 
inspiration for his “Special Methods of Induction Applicable to 
Quantity”, and that (3) Whewell’s tidal research helped him to 
develop and refine his philosophical-methodological ideas in a 
significant way. Of course, that is not to say that only his tidal 
research did so. Whewell was a many-sided man with varying 
scientific interests and it is likely that other branches of science 
contributed to this process as well. As noted above65, taking these 
other disciplines into account cannot be undertaken here and I leave 
it to bolder and stronger scholars to point out their significance. 
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2
 See Ducheyne (in press a) for extensive review of these 
monographs. 
3
 Valuable contextualisation of Whewell can be found in: Fisch & 
Schaffer (1991), Snyder (2006), Yeo (1979), (1993), and (2009). 
4
 In the Fourth Day of the Dialogo (1632), Galileo offered a geo-
kinetic explanation of the tides (Galilei (2001)). An early version of 
this theory was written in 1616 in a piece entitled Discorso del 
flusso e reflusso del mare. To Galileo’s mind, the tides were a 
definite physical proof that the earth moved (see furthermore: 
Ducheyne (2006), pp. 453-459, Palmieri (1998), and Naylor 
(2007)). 
5
 For an excellent overview of the development of nineteenth-
century theories of tidal phenomena, see especially Darrigol 
(2003). On the history of the study of the tides in general see: 
Cartwright (2001) and Deacon (1971). 
6
 It should be stressed that, although Whewell’s tidal papers were 
published under his name, they were the joint outcome of the 
collaborative work, made possible by the British Association for 
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the Advancement of Science and the British Admirality, of various 
observers, seamen, calculators and tide table makers and that 
before Whewell’s publications a renewed interest for tidology was 
awoken in Great Britain (Reidy (2008), pp. 81-86, pp. 90-121). 
According to Whewell, tidal research (and science by extension) 
was hierarchically structured: the “scientist” did the theoretical 
processing (theory construction and refinement) of the data 
provided by “subordinate labourers” of “less elevated pretensions” 
(ibid., pp. 15-16, pp. 198-235, p. 238, p. 254, p. 270). These 
labourers occasionally made active contributions. Reidy has 
documented Thomas G. Bunt’s, Daniel Ross’ and Thomas 
Bywater’s crucial role in Whewell’s tidal research (ibid., pp. 204-
228). 
7
 The term ‘looker-on-science’ might be used rightfully for the 
early-Whewell. Cf.: “There is another point of view which occurs 
to us lookers on, who, not making a single experiment to further 
the progress of science, employ ourselves with twisting the results 
of other people into all possible speculations mathematical, 
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physical, and metaphysical.” (Whewell to Herschel, 1 November 
1818, CW, XVI, p. 29). Note that Yeo uses this letter to strengthen 
his ‘looker-on science’ thesis (Yeo (1993), p. 54). 
8
 Yeo correctly points out that Whewell admitted that “there is 
nothing of such a stamp, that what I have attempted, as entitles me 
to be considered an eminent man of science” (Whewell to 
Murchison, 18 September 1840, CW, XVI, p. 286; cited in Yeo 
(1993), p. 55). 
9
 The Method of Least Squares is a variation of the Method of 
Means. It is helpful in establishing the most probable law by 
selecting that law of which the sum of the squares of errors is as 
small as possible. 
10
 In a crossed out section of the printer’s copy of the Philosophy of 
the Inductive Sciences Whewell wrote in a more cavalier moment 
that the Method of Curves is “the true way of discovering the laws 
of nature by which they are produced” (WP, R.6.189(6), f. 52r). 
11
 On the Method of Means, see: Whewell (1835), p. 84; Whewell 
(1837b), p. 231; PIS, V, pp. 403-408; on the Method of Curves, 
 77 
                                                                                                              
cotidal lines and T.G. Bunt’s the tide-recording device, see: 
Whewell (1833), p. 147, p. 149, p. 157; Whewell (1837a), p. 76; 
Whewell (1838b), p. 250; PIS, V, pp. 395-403; Whewell (1848), p. 
24; on the Method of Residues, see: Whewell (1831b), pp. 401-
402; WP, R.18.118, f. 137r; Whewell (1834a), p. 24, p. 26, p. 27, 
pp. 29-31, p. 33, p. 43; Whewell to Lubbock, 30 October 1835, 
CW, XVI, pp. 229-230; Whewell (1837a), pp. 76-77; Whewell 
(1838a), p. 236; PIS, V, pp. 409-412). 
12
 Here I use the second, and most commonly cited edition of the 
Philosophy of the Inductive Science (1847). The parts that are 
relevant to Whewell’s “Special Methods of Induction Applicable to 
Quantity” are identical in both editions – apart from some small 
text-editorial changes (Whewell (1840c), pp. 542-559; PIS, V, pp. 
395-412). Book XI “Of the Construction of Science” of the first 
edition (Whewell (1840c), pp. 169-277) is identical to Book XI of 
the second edition (PIS, V, pp. 3-118). The printer’s copy of the 
first edition of the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences is preserved 
at Wren Library (WP, R.6.188-9). It contains some crossed out 
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sections that didn’t make it to print. In the second edition more 
titles and subtitles were added. The “Special Methods of Induction 
Applicable to Quantity” reappeared in Novum Organum 
Renovatum (the third edition of Philosophy of the Inductive 
Sciences; 1858) without relevant changes (NOR, VI, pp. 202-219). 
13
 Note that at places in the History of the Inductive Science where 
Whewell discussed taking the means of observed values (1 
occurrence: HIS, I, p. 109), residual phenomena (8 occurrences: 
HIS, I, p. 231, p. 237, p. 242; HIS, II, p. 259, p. 388, p. 505, p. 539; 
and, HIS, III, p. 39),  and curves (31 occurrences: HIS, I, p. 447; 
HIS, II, p. 24, p. 29, pp. 37-38, pp. 56-57, p. 75, p. 94, p. 99, p. 
109, p. 112, pp. 163-164, p. 168, p. 243, p. 313, p. 330, p. 336, p. 
338, p. 349, p. 353, p. 381, p. 386, p. 405, p. 418, p. 457, p. 486, 
pp. 521-522, pp. 422-423 and HIS, III, p. 72, p. 74, p. 108, p. 117), 
he remained fairly superficial on these issues: he never comes close 
to a detailed methodologically relevant discussion. In his tidology, 
the Special Methods are used constantly and explicitly described in 
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the methodologically advanced way of his later Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences. 
14
 Michael Ruse has suggested that scientific activity inspired 
Whewell’s philosophy but did not further elaborate on this (Ruse 
(1976), p. 252). One important caveat from the outset: I to not 
assume that tidology only helped to develop his methodological 
views. Other contemporary scientific disciplines (e.g. optics, 
crystallography, photistics, thermotics, political economy, etc.) 
may have contributed to this as well. This remains to be further 
documented, but cannot be undertaken here. In my own defence, I 
stress that tidology was the only scientific discipline to which 
Whewell contributed over such long a time-span and to such level 
of engagement. That Whewell’s tidology and his philosophy of 
science interacted has been asserted by others, yet the details of this 
interaction have not been documented – leaving such claims at a 
level of high generality. 
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15
 As developed in Fisch (1991a), chapters 2 and 3 and Fisch 
(1991b). On the meaning of erotetic reconstruction, see Fisch 
(1991a), pp. 11-16.  
16
 For devastating criticism on Fisch’s portrayal of Whewell as a 
“Langrangian-Baconian”, see Becher (1980), pp. 14-34 and 
especially Becher (1992). 
17
 Much of my recent work on Whewell is intended to provide an 
alternative reconstruction of Whewell’s philosophical-
methodological development. Whewell’s tidal researches are but 
one part within that story. A second part of that story, which is 
covered in Ducheyne (in press a and b), is Whewell’s appropriation 
of specific Kantian elements in his epistemology – I do not, 
however, conceive of Whewell as an (orthodox) Kantian in the way 
that Robert E. Butts has portrayed him (Butts (1965)). A third and 
final part, which remains to be carried out, is to assess what 
Whewell learned methodologically from studying the history of 
science. 
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18
 Cantor claims that Whewell turned to the history of science in 
order to test his theory of induction (Cantor (1991), p. 69, p. 71). 
According to Whewell’s own statements, his History and 
Philosophy were composed simultaneously (HIS, I, p. 16). In a 
letter to Richard Jones on 6 October 1834, Whewell wrote: “I write 
at the same time two Books, one of history, and one of philosophy, 
and when I find myself, in the course of my historical researches, 
becoming metaphysical and transcendental, I open Book two, in 
which all these things fall into their places” (CW, XVI, p. 193). 
19
 Cf. Ruse (1991), p. 87. Again Ruse’s claim is not based on a 
detailed account of Whewell’s tidology. 
20
 His tidal papers are shortly documented in Todhunter’s account 
of Whewell’s writings (CW, XV, pp. 75-88; see furthermore: Ruse 
(1976) and Becher (1991)). On Whewell’s tidology see: Deacon 
(1971), pp. 251-275 and Reidy (2008), pp. 122-271. 
21
 A draft of Whewell (1836a) is preserved at WP, R.6.2023(61). 
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22
 It is worth observing that Whewell copied exactly this quote in 
one of his notebooks on induction (ca. 1830-1833) (WP, R.18.1710, 
p. 41, p. 43). 
23
 Whewell’s first paper on the tides counted 90 pages.  
24
 Cf. Whewell’s later statements in On the Philosophy of 
Discovery (1860) (PD, VII, p. 184). 
25
 On sciences of classification (which he contrasted with sciences 
of experiment) Whewell noted: “We have some sciences of 
thoughts where the conceptions are rather interpretative than 
regulative – that is they do not present to us the facts wch we 
consider, as necessarily together bound in space, time”, i.e. “they 
do not present them to us as being necessarily thought of in a 
certain way” (WP, R.18.1715, f. 50r). 
26
 The significance of the introduction of technical terminology, 
Whewell noted, had already been stressed by John Herschel in his 
Preliminary Discourse (1831) (Whewell (1831b), p. 390). 
27
 This distinction can further be found in WP, R.18.175, p. 25 
(entry dated on 1832) and in WP, R.18.1715, f. 46r. On WP, 
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R.18.1710, p. 17, Whewell distinguished between “1 Observations 
of Phænomena 2 Phænomenal Laws – 3 Physical Laws”. Later in 
the History of the Inductive Sciences Whewell contrasted formal 
sciences with physical sciences. 
28
 Cf. Cantor’s view that by the mid-1830s Whewell had achieved 
“an early but not fully worked-out version [of his theory of 
induction]” (Cantor (1991), p. 69). 
29
 For a defence of such reading of these notebooks, I refer the 
reader to Ducheyne (in press b). 
30
 Related points are made in: Wettersten (1993), pp. 495-499 and 
Snyder (1999), pp. 532-539, pp. 546-550. 
31
 See Whewell (1833), (1834a), (1834b), (1835), (1836a), (1836b), 
(1836c), (1837a), (1837b), (1838a), (1838b), (1839a), (1839b), 
(1840a), (1840b), (1848), (1850), and (1851). 
32
 Although I cannot offer here a detailed chronology of Whewell’s 
papers on the tides, the following subsection is, I claim, 
representative of his tidology. I shall focus on those aspects that are 
most relevant to the claims I seek to argue for. 
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33
 In an undated newspaper article reporting on a lecture of 
Whewell at the Bristol Institution, an anonymous journalist wrote: 
“By this means [tide tables and cotidal lines] the phenomena are 
discussed, and the rules which they follow extracted from them; 
and this investigation exemplifies on important step in science, 
which may be called the determination of phenomena. Next 
follows a higher step, - the determination of causes. The causes of 
the phenomena, in this case, we do not doubt to be the attraction of 
the sun and moon; but to trace from the theory the effects of these 
causes, and to show that it agrees with the detail of the phenomena, 
is a task so complicated and arduous, that it has not been executed.” 
(WP, R.6.206). 
34
 Whewell later gave the following examples of causes: substance, 
force and polarity (NOR, VI, p. 247 [Aphorism LXI]).  
35
 This was shortly after the publication of Lubbock (1832). The 
paper was read on 17 November 1831. 
36
 Whewell probably derived the expression ‘cotidal lines’ from 
Thomas Young’s ‘contemporary lines’ and suggested the term in 
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1831 to Lubbock (Reidy (2008), p. 162, p. 194; Deacon (1971), p. 
258; Marmer, (1928)). Alexander von Humboldt’s work on 
isothermal lines (Humboldt, von (1817)) might also have been a 
source of inspiration. For a discussion of the significance of 
Whewell’s graphical method in statistics and economy, see Maas & 
Morgan (2002). Cotidal lines thus represented the ridge of the tide-
wave at a place, i.e. that protuberance of the water upon the surface 
of the ocean which moves along the seas and brings high-tide (and 
low-tide) at the time the elevated (or depressed) parts reach that 
place (Whewell (1833), p. 149). Correspondingly, cotidal lines at 
successive moments represent the successive positions of the tide-
wave. The great advantage of such lines is that they could trace the 
general patterns of the tides which are not easily traceable from tide 
tables alone. 
37
 The moon is closest to the earth at perigee where the tidal effect 
increases and farthest at apogee where the tidal effect decreases. 
Similar effects occur when the earth is in aphelion and perihelion. 
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38
 Whewell took over this term from Lubbock who derived it from 
Lalande’s ‘établissement’ (Cartwright (2001), p. 111). Cf. Whewell 
(1834a), p. 19, Whewell (1836b), p. 131 and Whewell (1840b), p. 
256.  
39
 Lubbock’s original formula did not include the correction for the 
moon’s parallax. 
40
 In a letter to David Forbes on 7 March 1836, Whewell wrote on 
the solar corrections: “This almost completes the list of corrections, 
and I have also been tolerably successful in showing their 
connection with the forces; but this problem remains to be solved as 
one of hydrodynamics.” (WP, O.15.4748(2)). 
41
 On this matter see Hankins (2007). This method is identical to 
the Method of Curves (PIS, V, p. 399). 
42
 This was already implied by the data gathered in Whewell 
(1835). There he concluded that the discrepancies between theory 
and observation “make it clear that we cannot correctly use the tide 
tables of one place to determine the tides of another, by adding or 
subtracting a constant interval, as is often done” (ibid., p. 86). 
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43
 Needless to say, that understanding the seas in the Victorian age 
was of vital economical, geo-political and strategic importance. 
This is masterfully documented in Reidy (2008). 
44
 Since it is not my aim here to provide a new interpretation of the 
contents of Whewell’s philosophy in general, I shall not deal with 
this issue in extenso. However, it might be pointed out that I have 
provided a novel interpretation of Whewell’s ideas on the relation 
between Fundamental Ideas, Axioms and Scientific Laws in 
general and his concept of necessity in particular in my in press
 
b 
and in press
 
c. On Whewell’s philosophy, see Butts (1965), Fisch 
(1985b) and (1991a), Morrison (1997), Snyder (1994), (1999), and 
(2006). 
45
 Cf. “Without Thoughts there could be no connexion; without 
Things, there could be no reality.” (PIS, IV, p. 18). 
46
 Whewell’s attempt at “tidal colligation” is discussed in Reidy 
(2008), pp. 193-194, pp. 243-245. 
47
 Cf. Reidy’s claim that for Whewell a cotidal map was a 
“unifying tool” (Reidy (2008), p. 166, cf. pp. 193-194). 
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48
 This was also highlighted in Whewell’s historical studies (cf. his 
“Inductive Tables” (HIS, I, pp. 10-11). 
49
 Whewell for instance noted that Hipparchian epicycles and 
eccentrics are clearly conceived hypotheses as they provide a 
resolution of the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies (HIS, I, 
p. 140). Without the strict examination and successful analysis of 
the apparent motions of the celestial bodies, the real arrangement 
would not have been discovered (HIS, I, p. 143). 
50
 In Novum Organum Renovatum Whewell later recorded that a 
scientist “allows no natural yearning for the offspring of his own 
mind to draw him aside from the higher duty of loyalty to his 
sovereign, Truth” (NOR, VI, p. 81). 
51
 In his first tidal paper, Whewell considered several “derivative 
waves” (and their interference) produced by the presence of 
islands, bays, sea arms and canals. These derivative waves were not 
“affected at all by the direct action of the sun or the moon” 
(Whewell (1833), pp. 150-156). 
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52
 Laplace’s tidal computations were very laborious. On Laplace’s 
tidal research, see: Reidy (2009), pp. 50-56. 
53
 On the occasion of Whewell’s obtainment of his royal medal, an 
anonymous composer wrote: “The present state of theoretical 
hydrodynamics throws very little light upon the causes of these 
curious phænomena. In order to see the mechanical reasons for the 
forms and distribution of the cotidal lines, it would be necessary to 
solve the problem not only of the motion of a wave in a canal of 
variable depth, but also in a basin of variable depth and given form, 
a problem hitherto unattempted.” ([Anon.], 1838, p. 2). 
54
 In his doctoral dissertation, Reidy explains Whewell’s preference 
for equilibrium-theory by pointing to Whewell’s views on the 
history of astronomy: in contrast to Laplace’s account, Newton’s 
theory, allowed the construction of (tide) tables, an activity which 
was crucial in the sequel of inductive epochs (Reidy (2000), pp. 
374-375). While the explanation Reidy gives is basically correct 
(e.g. HIS, II, p. 161, p. 194), it contains but a part of the answer: 
Whewell’s philosophy of science, as I show in what follows, also 
   
90 
                                                                                                              
needs to be taken into account in the explanation of Whewell’s 
preference of equilibrium-theory. 
55
 Although Laplace compared his theory with observation, he 
never made predictions directly from theory (Reidy (2008), p. 53). 
Whewell made this complaint already in 1833 (Whewell (1834b), 
p. 665). 
56
 Coherence refers to a (worthy) hypothesis’ capacity to bind 
together observations without ad hoc modifications of the theory. 
57
 Although Whewell distinguished between the initial moment of 
generation of a scientific proposition and the later moment of 
justification, he seemed to have opposed the separation between the 
context of justification and the historical and psychological origins 
of such proposition (Schickore (2006), p. 62). 
58
 That theory-selection is a forward-looking enterprise is the main 
lesson of Newton’s fourth rule of philosophizing (Schliesser 
(2005)). Whewell commented on Newton’s fourth rule of 
philosophizing in PD, VII, pp. 196-198 and PIS, V, pp. 291-292. 
Whewell noted: “The realy valuable part of the Fourth Rule is that 
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which implies that a constant verification, and, if necessary, 
rectification, of truths discovered by induction, should go on in the 
scientific world.” (PIS, V, p. 291). 
59
 Cf. “It is a test of true theories not only to account for, but to 
predict phenomena.” (NOR, VI, p. 70 (Aphorism XII)).  
60
 Whewell compared the tendency of the rate of profits of 
agriculture and the rate of other employments to balance each other 
to the tendency to tidal equilibrium: “Supposing the preceding 
postulates to be true [i.e., the postulates of equilibrium and price], 
the problem in which they are applied are much simplified by 
assuming such an equilibrium to obtain: but along with this 
simplification we incur a necessary and perpetual, and, it may be, a 
very considerable deviation from the circumstances of actual fact. 
In reality, this equilibrium is never attained: probably in most cases 
it is never approximated. […] We are to recollect therefore, that 
even if our principles were exact, deductions from them made 
according to the method we are now following, would give us only 
a faint and distant resemblance of the state of things produced by 
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the perpetual struggle and conflict of such principles with variable 
circumstances. Such deductions however would probably have 
some resemblance, in the general outline of their results, to the true 
state of things.  They would offer us a first approximation: and in 
difficult problems of physics, it is precisely by such a 
simplification as this, that a first approximation is obtained. Thus in 
investigating of the problem of the tides, we have a very complex 
case of the motion of a fluid: but Newton’s mode of treating the 
question was, to consider what would be the form of equilibrium of 
the ocean, acted upon by the forces which produce the tides: and 
this solution of the problem, though necessarily inexact, was 
accepted as the best which could easily be obtained. The 
investigations of Laplace and other who have since treated the 
problem on its true grounds, as a question of hydrodynamics, have 
shewn Newton’s solution explains rightly the main features of the 
phenomenon. […] The quantities which we neglect must be of an 
inferior order to those which we take into account; otherwise we 
obtain no approximation at all. We may with some utility make the 
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theory of the tides a question of equilibrium, but our labour would 
be utterly misspent if we should attempt to consider on such 
principles the theory of waves.” (Whewell (1831a), pp. 166-167). 
As in tidology, Whewell advised against premature generalisation 
and promoted the collection of a substantial body of political-
economical data before theory construction: “The most profitable 
and philosophical speculations of Political Economy are however 
of a different kind: they are those which are employed not in 
reasoning from principles, but to them: in extracting from a wide 
and patient survey of facts the laws according to which 
circumstances and conditions determine the progress of wealth, and 
the fortunes of men.” (ibid., p. 197; see furthermore: Henderson 
(1996), Hollander (1983), and Maas, (2005), chapter 3). While 
Whewell accepted that in tidology the dominant cause, which 
delivers the basis for a first approximation, had been successfully 
established by Newton, in political economy he advise to begin 
with inductively tracing the dominant cause of wealth. 
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61
 In this paper he conceived of the motions of the tides as taking 
place in a basin of uniform depth and approached them 
mathematically in terms of vertical slices. The differential 
equations derived by Laplace proved impossible to integrate 
without the introduction of some implausible assumptions (Reidy 
(2008), p. 53). 
62
 Whewell had used the term “stationary undulation” already in 
1839 (WP, R.6.2024, f. 109r).  
63
 William Hewett, by a sounding devise of his own making, 
confirmed Whewell’s predicted point of no tide in 1840 (Reidy 
(2008), pp. 186-187). 
64
 Rollin A. Harris coined this term meaning ‘running’ (‘dromos’) 
around (‘amphi-‘) (Cartwright (2001), p. 121) around 1904. 
65
 See footnote 14. 
